Discrimination is Good

๐——๐—œ๐—ฆ๐—–๐—ฅ๐—œ๐— ๐—œ๐—ก๐—”๐—ง๐—œ๐—ข๐—ก ๐—œ๐—ฆ ๐—š๐—ข๐—ข๐——
On Tuesday, the US Supreme Court heard oral representations in two cases where biological males were demanding the right to participate in womenโ€™s sport due to their trans-identification as females. They were both challenging recent legislation designed to protect womenโ€™s sport; the Fairness in Womenโ€™s Sport Act in Idaho, and the Save Womenโ€™s Sport Act of 2021 in West Virginia, both of which prohibit biological males from participating in womenโ€™s sport.
At stake in these cases is not merely the inclusion or exclusion of particular athletes, but a much deeper question: whether discrimination grounded in objective reality is sometimes not only legitimate, but morally and socially necessary.
Both plaintiffs in these recent cases claimed they were being unfairly discriminated against due to their biological sex. But what transpired in both cases was fascinating. In both cases the legal representatives for the plaintiffs were unable to provide a definition for male or female sex or gender.
The judges in both cases essentially began by asking whether it was appropriate to have separate sports competitions for men and women. Both plaintiffโ€™s lawyers agreed that it was appropriate. But when asked to clearly define what the terms โ€˜womanโ€™ and โ€˜manโ€™ actually mean, the lawyers couldnโ€™t do so. For example, lawyer Kathleen Hartnett stated, โ€œ๐™’๐™š ๐™™๐™ค ๐™ฃ๐™ค๐™ฉ ๐™๐™–๐™ซ๐™š ๐™– ๐™™๐™š๐™›๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ž๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™›๐™ค๐™ง ๐™ฉ๐™๐™š ๐™˜๐™ค๐™ช๐™ง๐™ฉโ€. She argued that she was not wanting to debate the terms โ€˜maleโ€™ or โ€˜femaleโ€™ but was simply arguing that it was โ€œ๐™™๐™ž๐™จ๐™˜๐™ง๐™ž๐™ข๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™–๐™ฉ๐™ค๐™ง๐™ฎโ€ and โ€œ๐™ช๐™ฃ๐™›๐™–๐™ž๐™ง ๐™ฉ๐™ค ๐™š๐™ญ๐™˜๐™ก๐™ช๐™™๐™š ๐™—๐™ž๐™ง๐™ฉ๐™-๐™จ๐™š๐™ญ ๐™ข๐™–๐™ก๐™š๐™จ ๐™˜๐™–๐™ฉ๐™š๐™œ๐™ค๐™ง๐™ž๐™˜๐™–๐™ก๐™ก๐™ฎ ๐™›๐™ง๐™ค๐™ข ๐™ฌ๐™ค๐™ข๐™š๐™ฃโ€™๐™จ ๐™ฉ๐™š๐™–๐™ข๐™จ.โ€
Let me make two brief points.
Firstly, the inability to precisely define male and female is deeply problematic for the trans movement. Their fall-back definition continues to essentially be โ€˜๐™– ๐™ฌ๐™ค๐™ข๐™–๐™ฃ ๐™ž๐™จ ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™ฎ๐™ค๐™ฃ๐™š ๐™ฌ๐™๐™ค ๐™ฉ๐™๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™ ๐™จ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™š๐™ฎ ๐™–๐™ง๐™š ๐™– ๐™ฌ๐™ค๐™ข๐™–๐™ฃ ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™™ ๐™– ๐™ข๐™–๐™ฃ ๐™ž๐™จ ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™ฎ๐™ค๐™ฃ๐™š ๐™ฌ๐™๐™ค ๐™ฉ๐™๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™ ๐™จ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™š๐™ฎ ๐™–๐™ง๐™š ๐™– ๐™ข๐™–๐™ฃโ€™. But this is a ludicrous position to hold. If the same subjective self-identification were applied to any other area of life, society would be in chaos. Consider the following:
๐—ฉ๐—ผ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น๐˜†: A doctor is anyone who thinks they are a doctor. An airline pilot is anyone who thinks they are an airline pilot.
๐—ฃ๐—ต๐˜†๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—น๐—ผ๐—ด๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น๐˜†: An amputee is anyone who thinks they are an amputee. A cancer sufferer is anyone who thinks they are a cancer sufferer.
๐—š๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น๐˜†: An indigenous American Indian is anyone who thinks they are an indigenous American Indian.
In all these and a myriad of other cases, discarding objective definitions in favour of subjective opinion would result in chaos and, in many instances, would be extremely dangerous.
๐™Ž๐™š๐™˜๐™ค๐™ฃ๐™™๐™ก๐™ฎ, and following on from this, discrimination that results in exclusion is very often a GOOD thing for society. Excluding people from being a doctor or airline pilot based on their lack of training and qualifications protects us. Allowing someone who โ€˜thinksโ€™ they are a doctor to practise medicine would be utterly foolish and dangerous.
Similarly, giving someone who merely โ€˜thinksโ€™ they are an amputee or a cancer sufferer financial assistance or medical treatment such as chemotherapy or strong pain relief would be equally foolish, costly and potentially dangerous. And providing government assistance to people simply because they have decided they โ€˜feelโ€™ like an indigenous American Indian would be equally costly and foolish.
Discrimination is very often a good thing. It protects society from falling into chaos by excluding people or things that are inappropriate or even dangerous. For instance, our local primary school will not allow a 40-year-old male to enrol in a Prep or Kindergarten class simply because he thinks he is 5 years old. He is excluded in order to protect the genuine 5-year-olds. We discriminate against him appropriately.
My superannuation fund will exclude people from being employed as fund managers and investment managers if they have no training in finance โ€“ regardless of how strongly an applicant might โ€˜feelโ€™ or โ€˜thinkโ€™ they are a financial wizard. They are discriminated against appropriately and excluded from those important positions in order to protect investors.
Discrimination that results in exclusion is very often a good thing that preserves order and safety in society.
Of course, discrimination must be appropriate. And for it to be appropriate, it must be based upon objective standards, definitions and guidelines, rather than on personal prejudice.
In the case of excluding biological males from womenโ€™s sport, there are clear objective grounds for doing so. There are significant physiological differences between biological males and biological females, including muscle mass, skeletal density, lung capacity and other factors. These differences mean that it would be unfair and, at times, unsafe for biological males to compete against biological females in most sports. This is why various womenโ€™s sports associations around the world are now speaking out against trans inclusion in their competitions.
In the two recent US Supreme Court cases last Tuesday, lawyers for the trans identified individuals were essentially saying, โ€˜๐™ˆ๐™ฎ ๐™˜๐™ก๐™ž๐™š๐™ฃ๐™ฉ ๐™ž๐™จ ๐™—๐™š๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™œ ๐™™๐™ž๐™จ๐™˜๐™ง๐™ž๐™ข๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™–๐™ฉ๐™š๐™™ ๐™–๐™œ๐™–๐™ž๐™ฃ๐™จ๐™ฉ ๐™–๐™ฃ๐™™ ๐™š๐™ญ๐™˜๐™ก๐™ช๐™™๐™š๐™™ ๐™›๐™ง๐™ค๐™ข ๐™ฌ๐™ค๐™ข๐™š๐™ฃโ€™๐™จ ๐™จ๐™ฅ๐™ค๐™ง๐™ฉ ๐™—๐™–๐™จ๐™š๐™™ ๐™ค๐™ฃ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™š๐™ž๐™ง ๐™—๐™ž๐™ค๐™ก๐™ค๐™œ๐™ž๐™˜๐™–๐™ก ๐™จ๐™š๐™ญโ€™. Interestingly, in both cases the relevant judges essentially replied, โ€˜๐™”๐™š๐™จ. ๐˜ผ๐™ฃ๐™™ ๐™ฌ๐™๐™–๐™ฉโ€™๐™จ ๐™ฌ๐™ง๐™ค๐™ฃ๐™œ ๐™ฌ๐™ž๐™ฉ๐™ ๐™ฉ๐™๐™–๐™ฉ?โ€™ The lawyers had no clear answer.
Let us be clear: the question is not whether discrimination occurred, but whether it was justified. In the case of womenโ€™s sport, exclusion based on biological sex is not an injusticeโ€”it is the very mechanism by which fairness is preserved.